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Before the end of  World War II constitutional courts or courts with 
constitutional jurisdiction were a rarity. Although constitutions had been 
in place long before, a worldwide demand for constitutional adjudication 
arose only after the experiences with the many totalitarian systems of  the 
20th century. The post-totalitarian constitutional assemblies regarded judicial 
review as the logical consequence of  constitutionalism. In a remarkable 
judgment, the Israeli Supreme Court said in 1995: “Judicial review is the soul 
of  the constitution itself. Strip the constitution of  judicial review and you 
have removed its very life… It is therefore no wonder that judicial review is 
now developing. The majority of  enlightened democratic states have judicial 
review… The Twentieth Century is the century of  judicial review”.1 Based 
on this universal trend, the Israeli Court claimed the power of  judicial review 
even though it had not been explicitly endowed with it in the constitution. So, 
just as the transition from absolute rule to constitutionalism had modified 
the relationship between law and politics, this relationship was now modified 
by the establishment of  constitutional courts. 
As long as law was regarded as being of  divine origin, politics 
were subordinate to law. Political power derived its authority from the 
task to maintain and enforce divine law, and this did not include the right 
to make law. When the Reformation undermined the divine basis of  the 
legal order and led to the religious civil wars of  the 16th and 17th centuries 
the inversion of  the traditional relationship between law and politics was 
regarded as a precondition for the restoration of  social peace. The political 
1 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Village, Civil Appeal No. 6821/93, decided 1995.
 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 3, t. 1, p. 55-71, set.-dez., 2019 56 
T
O
M
O
 1
ruler acquired the power to make law regardless of  the contested religious 
truth. Law became a product of  politics. It derived its binding force no 
longer from God’s will but from the ruler’s will. It was henceforth positive 
law. Eternal or natural law, despite of  its name, was not law, but philosophy.
Constitutionalism as it emerged in the last quarter of  the 18th century 
was an attempt to re-establish the supremacy of  the law, albeit under the 
condition that there was no return to divine or eternal law. The solution 
of  the problem consisted in the reflexivity of  positive law. Making and 
enforcing the law was itself  subjected to legal regulation. To make this 
possible a hierarchy had to be established within the legal order. The law 
that regulated legislation and law-enforcement had to be superior to the 
law that emanates from the political process. Yet, since there was no return 
to divine law the higher law was itself  the product of  a political decision. 
But in order to fulfil its function of  submitting politics to law it needed a 
source different from ordinary politics. In accordance with the theory that, 
in the absence of  a divine basis of  rulership the only possible legitimization 
of  political power is the consent of  the governed, this source was found in 
the people. The people replaced the ruler as sovereign, just as previously 
the ruler had replaced God. But the role of  the popular sovereign was 
limited to enacting the constitution while the exercise of  political power 
was entrusted to representatives of  the people who could act only on the 
basis and within the framework of  the constitution.
Hence, one can say that the very essence of  constitutionalism is the 
submission of  politics to law. This function distinguishes constitutional law 
from ordinary law in various respects. There is, first, a difference in object. 
The object of  constitutional law is politics. Constitutional law regulates 
the formation and exercise of  political power. The power holders are the 
addressees of  constitutional law. Secondly, constitutional and ordinary 
law have different sources. Since constitutional law brings forth legitimate 
political power it cannot emanate from that same power. It is made by 
or attributed to the people. Thirdly, and consequently, the making of  
constitutional law differs from the making of  ordinary law. It is usually a 
special body that formulates constitutional law and its adoption is subject 
to a special procedure in which either the people takes the decision or, if  
a representative body is called upon to decide, a supermajority is required. 
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Fourthly, constitutional law differs from ordinary law in rank: it is higher 
law. In the case of  conflict between constitutional law and ordinary law or 
acts of  ordinary law application, constitutional law trumps. What has been 
regulated in the constitution is no longer open to political decision and the 
majority rule does not apply. This does not mean a total juridification of  
politics. Such a total juridification would be the end of  politics and turn 
it into mere administration. Constitutional law determines who is entitled 
to take political decisions and which procedural and substantive rules 
have to be observed in order to give these decisions binding force. But 
the constitution neither predetermines the input into the constitutionally 
regulated procedures nor their outcome. It regulates the decision-making 
process but leaves the decisions themselves to the political process. It is a 
framework, not a substitute for politics. 
It might be said, finally, that constitutional law is characterized by 
a certain weakness compared to ordinary law. Ordinary law is made by 
government and applies to the people. If  they do not obey, government 
is entitled to use force. Constitutional law, by contrast, is made by or 
at least attributed to the people as its ultimate source and it applies to 
government. If  the government does not comply with the requirements of  
constitutional law there is no superior power to enforce it. This weakness 
may differ in degree, depending on the function of  the constitution. With 
respect to the constitutive function the structure of  public power will 
usually conform to the constitutional arrangement. With respect to its 
function to regulate the exercise of  political power this cannot be taken 
for granted. The historical evidence is abundant.
It was this weakness that gave rise to constitutional adjudication, 
in the United States soon after the invention of  constitutionalism, in 
Europe and other parts of  the world only after the collapse of  the 
fascist and racist, socialist and military dictatorships beginning in the 
1950s and culminating in the 1990s. Although many of  these systems 
had constitutions, their impact was minimal, and invoking constitutional 
rights could be dangerous to citizens. In the light of  this experience, 
constitutional courts were generally regarded as necessary to the 
completion of  constitutionalism. If  the very essence of  constitutionalism 
is the submission of  politics to law, the very essence of  constitutional 
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adjudication is to enforce constitutional law vis-à-vis government. This 
implies judicial review of  political acts including legislation. However, 
constitutional courts or courts with constitutional jurisdiction cannot 
fully compensate for the weakness of  constitutional law. Since the power 
to use physical force remains in the hands of  the political branches of  
government, courts are helpless when politicians refuse to comply with 
the constitution or disregard court orders. 
But apart from this situation, which is exceptional in a well-
functioning liberal democracy with a deeply-rooted sense for the rule 
of  law, it makes a difference whether or not a political system adopts 
constitutional adjudication. Even a government that is generally willing 
to comply with the constitution will be biased regarding the question of  
what exactly the constitution forbids or requires in a certain situation. 
Politicians tend to interpret the constitution in the light of  their political 
interests and intentions. In a system without constitutional adjudication 
usually the interpretation of  the majority prevails. In the long run this 
will undermine the achievement of  constitutionalism. By contrast, in a 
system with constitutional adjudication an institution exists that does not 
pursue political intentions, is not subject to election and specializes on 
constitutional interpretation in a professional manner. It is thus less biased 
and can uphold constitutional requirements vis-à-vis the elected majority. 
Even more important is the preventive effect of  constitutional adjudication. 
The mere existence of  a constitutional court causes the political majority 
to raise the question of  the constitutionality of  a political measure quite 
early in the political process and in a more neutral way. It observes its own 
political plans through the eyes of  the constitutional court. 
Hans Kelsen, whom the Israeli Supreme Court quotes approvingly 
in the Mizrahi opinion, may have exaggerated when he said that a 
constitution without constitutional adjudication is just like not having a 
constitution at all. There is a number of  long-established democracies 
where the constitution matters even though no constitutional review 
exists. Here constitutional values have become part of  the legal and 
political culture so that there is less need for institutionalized safeguards. 
But for the majority of  states, in particular for those who turned toward 
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constitutional democracy only recently, the constitution would not matter 
very much in day-to-day politics if  it did not enjoy the support of  a special 
agent that enforces the legal constraints to which the constitution submits 
politics. The small impact of  fundamental rights before the establishment 
of  judicial review proves this.
But the existence of  a constitutional court alone is not sufficient to 
guarantee that politicians respect the constitution. Just as constitutionalism 
is an endangered achievement, constitutional adjudication is also in danger. 
Politicians, even if  they originally agreed to establish judicial review, soon 
discover that its exercise by constitutional courts is often burdensome 
for them. Constitutions put politics under constraints and constitutional 
courts exist in order to enforce these constraints. Not everything that 
politicians find necessary – be it for themselves or their party, be it for 
what they deem good for the common interest – can be effectuated if  
the court finds that it does not conform to the constitution. Politicians 
therefore have a general interest in a constitutional court that, to put it 
mildly, is at least not adverse to their objectives and plans. But there is also 
a specific interest in the outcome of  constitutional litigation on which the 
implementation of  a certain policy depends. 
The danger is that any political interference with the judicial process 
would undermine the whole system of  constitutional democracy. This is 
why judges must be protected against political influence or pressure. The 
dividing line between the various organs of  the state drawn by the principle of  
separation of  powers is particularly strong where the judiciary is concerned. 
Independence of  the judiciary is indispensable for the functioning of  
a constitutional system and is therefore itself  in need of  constitutional 
protection. If  it is true that constitutional courts are helpless when political 
actors refuse to obey their orders, it is even more true that constitutional 
courts are useless when they cannot take their decisions independently 
from politics. The best protection of  judicial independence is, of  course, 
a deeply-rooted conviction on the part of  politicians that any interference 
with court procedures is unacceptable, supported by a strong backing for 
the constitution within society. But this cannot be taken for granted. Rather, 
special safeguards are necessary. Judicial independence must be guaranteed, 
not only against any attempt to directly influence the outcome of  litigation, 
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but also against more subtle ways of  putting pressure on the judiciary. This 
is why constitutions usually guarantee the irremovability of  judges and often 
a sufficient salary, to mention only a few devices. 
A special problem in this context is the recruitment of  judges of  
constitutional courts or courts with constitutional jurisdiction. Since these 
courts have a share in public power, the judges need democratic legitimation. 
If  they are not elected directly by the people, a circumstance which presents 
problems of  its own regarding judicial independence, some involvement 
of  the elected branches of  government in the recruitment process seems 
inevitable. Yet every involvement creates the temptation to elect or appoint 
deferential judges. Recruitment of  judges is the open flank of  judicial 
independence. A constitutional court that simply reflects political interests 
will hardly be able to keep the necessary distance from politics. Hence, 
safeguards against a politicization of  the court are of  vital importance. 
Most countries with constitutional adjudication have special 
provisions for the election or appointment of  constitutional judges. If  
they are elected by parliament often a supermajority, like the one required 
for amending the constitution, is prescribed. This means that majority 
and minority must agree on one candidate, which makes extreme partisan 
appointments unlikely. Other countries prefer a mixed system of  election 
and appointment by dividing the right to select constitutional judges 
among different bodies of  government. In others, non-political actors 
are involved in the process, for instance representatives of  the legal 
profession. It may be difficult to determine which system is best. But it 
is not difficult to see that some barriers against the threat of  a politically 
docile constitutional court must be erected if  constitutionalism is to live 
up to its aspirations. 
Judicial independence is the constitutional safeguard against the 
threat arising from politicians to the judges’ proper exercise of  their 
function. It is directed against attempts to induce judges not to apply 
the law but to bend to political expectations. This is an external threat. 
But it would be naïve to assume that this is the only threat to which the 
functioning of  the constitutional system is exposed. There is also an 
internal threat that comes from the judges themselves. It comes in two 
forms. One is the inclination to voluntarily follow, for what reasons ever, 
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political expectations or even party lines. The other is the temptation to 
adjudicate according to one’s own political preferences or ideas of  what 
is just and unjust rather than following constitutional standards. The 
constitutional guarantee of  judicial independence protects judges against 
politics, but it does not protect the constitutional system and society 
against judges who, for other reasons than direct political pressure, are 
willing to disobey or distort the law. 
For these reasons, external independence must be accompanied by 
internal independence. The constitutional guarantee of  judicial independence 
is not a personal privilege to decide at will, but a functional requirement. 
It enables judges to fulfil their function, namely to apply the law irrespectively 
of  the interests and expectations of  the parties to the litigation or powerful 
political or societal forces. It frees judges from extra-legal bonds, not to give 
them leeway in their decisions, but to enable them to decide according to 
the law. The reason for the independence from extra-legal bonds is to give 
full effect to the legal bonds to which judges are submitted. Submission to 
law is the necessary counterpart of  judicial independence. As with external 
independence, precautions can also be taken for internal independence.
However, since internal independence is largely a matter of  
professional ethics and individual character, the possibilities of  the law 
are limited. Gross misbehaviour such as corruption can of  course be 
outlawed and made a crime. Experience shows, however, that it is difficult 
to fight corruption within the judiciary when corruption is habitual among 
politicians and also in society. This seems to be a problem in a number 
of  new democracies. It is likewise justified to criminalize perversion of  
justice, though it is not easy to clearly distinguish perversion of  justice from 
false or questionable interpretation of  the law. This is why convictions 
because of  perversion of  justice are rare. But criminalizing corruption and 
perversion of  justice and removing judges from office who committed 
these crimes is not a violation of  the independence of  the judiciary.
A more subtle misconduct is the willingness or pre-disposition to 
interpret the law in a way that is favourable to certain political views or to a 
party or a candidate for political office, either in general or in an individual 
case. This usually comes in the guise of  legal argumentation that seeks to 
hide the fact that it is result-driven. This will not always occur intentionally. 
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Self-deception of  judges as to the motives of  their judicial behaviour is 
not impossible. The problem is that this type of  misconduct does not 
only appear in a number of  new democracies but can also be observed 
in mature constitutional states. The decision of  the US Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Gore in 2000 may serve as an example. There can hardly be a legal 
sanction in such cases, but there may be harsh public criticism or even a 
loss of  trust in the judiciary to which no court can remain indifferent.
II.
Law owes its existence to a political decision and political motives 
are legitimate in the process of  law-making. But in a constitutional 
democracy the role of  politics ends when it comes to applying the law. 
Application of  the law is a matter for the legal system and in this process 
political motives are illegitimate.  For this reason the division between law 
and politics is of  crucial importance. But what if  law application, and in 
particular constitutional adjudication, is in itself  a political operation so 
that all attempts to separate law from politics on the institutional level are 
thwarted on the level of  law application? This is a serious question, and it 
is a question that should not be confused with the abuse of  judicial power 
which lies in the intentional non-application or misapplication of  the law. 
Constitutional adjudication is of  course inevitably political in the 
sense that the object and the effect of  constitutional court decisions are 
political. This follows from the very function of  constitutional law, which is 
to regulate the formation and exercise of  political power, and the function 
of  constitutional courts, which consists in enforcing this law vis-à-vis 
politics. Constitutional courts form a branch of  government. Excluding 
political issues from judicial scrutiny would be the end of  constitutional 
review. Hence, the question can only be whether operations that judges 
undertake in order to find the law and to apply it to political issues are of  
a political or a legal character. 
This question arises because all analyses of  the process of  law 
application to concrete issues show that the text of  the law is unable to 
completely determine judicial decisions. One of  the reasons is that the 
law in general and constitutional law in particular is neither void of  gaps 
and contradictions nor always clear and unambiguous; this can hardly be 
different, given the fact that a legal system is a product of  different times, 
63 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 3, t. 1, p. 55-71, set.-dez., 2019 
T
O
M
O
 1
reacting to various challenges, inspired by different interests or concepts 
of  justice and depending on the use of  ordinary language. Filling the gaps, 
harmonizing the contradicting provisions, rendering them precise enough 
for the decision of  an issue is the task of  the appliers of  law, in the last resort 
of  the courts, which, in turn, draw profit from the efforts of  legal science. 
But even if  provisions are formulated as clearly and as coherently 
as possible they can raise questions when it comes to solving a concrete 
case. This incapacity to guarantee a full determination of  legal decisions, 
even in the case of  seemingly clear provisions, is inherent in the law 
because a law is by definition a general rule applicable to an indefinite 
number of  cases arising in the future. This is why it must be formulated 
in more or less abstract terms. Consequently, there will always remain 
a gap between the general and abstract norm on the one hand and the 
concrete and individual case on the other. The judge has to discover what 
the general norm means with regard to the case at hand. This is achieved 
by interpretation, which always precedes the application of  the norm. 
The general norm must be concretized as a more specific rule before the 
individual case can be decided.
Like the task of  filling gaps, harmonizing contradicting provisions 
and clarifying vague norms, concretization contains a creative element. 
Norm application must therefore always to some certain extent involve 
norm-construction. This is undisputable, though the degree can vary and 
rests on a number of  variables. The most important one is the precision 
of  a norm. A narrowly tailored norm leaves less room for the constructive 
element whereas a broad or even vague norm requires a lot of  concretization 
before it is fit for application to a case. Usually a constitution will contain 
more vague norms than, say, the code of  civil procedure. This is certainly 
true for the guiding principles and for fundamental rights, less so for 
organizational and procedural norms. Another variable is the age of  a 
norm; the older a norm, the larger the number of  problems that were not 
or could not have been foreseen by the legislature, and thus the broader 
the range of  questions of  meaning and applicability.
The mere fact that the law does not fully determine judgment in 
individual cases is not sufficient to turn law application from a legal into 
a political operation. It remains a legal operation if  what the judge adds to 
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the text of  the law in the process of  interpretation has its basis in the text 
and can be derived from it in a reasonable argumentative manner. If  not it 
becomes a political one. The task therefore is to distinguish between legal and 
non-legal arguments, be they political, economic or religious. This decision 
can only be taken within the legal system. No other system is competent 
to determine what counts as a legal argument. Within the legal system the 
distinction between a legal and a non-legal argument is the concern of  legal 
methodology. By doing so, methodology attempts to eliminate subjective 
influences from the interpretation of  the law so far as possible. This is why 
the distinction between legal and non-legal operations in the course of  law 
application becomes largely a question of  legal method.
Yet, different from the text of  the law that is the product of  a political 
decision and thus not at the disposition of  judges, methodology is itself  a 
product of  legal considerations. It emerges in the process of  interpreting 
and applying the law or is developed in scholarly discourse, but it is 
nowhere decreed authoritatively. This suggests that various methodologies 
can coexist, as can different variations of  a certain methodological creed. 
Method is a matter of  choice within the legal system. All historical 
attempts by legislators to prohibit interpretation or to prescribe a certain 
method have been in vain, since they have themselves been subject to 
interpretation. But the lack of  one authoritative method does not mean 
that methodology can justify any solution and thus loses its disciplining 
effect on judges. Just as certain legal orders have their time in history, so 
too do methodologies. There is usually a core of  accepted arguments or 
operations and a number of  arguments or operations that are regarded as 
unacceptable. The degree to which a method can succeed in eliminating 
all subjective elements from interpretation is controversial, though there 
were, and are, methods that claim this capacity.
One historically influential method that promised to eliminate 
subjective influences was legal positivism, not in its capacity as a theory of  
the validity of  law opposed to all natural law theories, but in its capacity as 
theory of  legal interpretation. For a positivist in this sense the legal norm 
consists of  its text and nothing else, and the only instrument to discover 
the meaning of  the text is philology and logic, i.e. neither the legislative 
history, nor the motives or the intent of  the legislature, nor the values 
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behind the norm, nor the social reality that brought forth the problems 
the norm was meant to solve and in which it is to take effect, nor the 
consequences the interpretation may entail. There can be but one correct 
understanding of  a norm and this remains correct as long as the norm is 
in force, no matter how the context changes. 
The problem with positivism was, on the one hand, that it could not 
fulfil its promise to eliminate all subjective influences on interpretation. 
Rather these influences were infused into the interpretation in a clandestine 
way, mostly in connection with the definition of  the notions used by the 
legislature. On the other hand, positivism prohibited an adaptation of  the 
law to social change by way of  interpretation. Since the social reality in which 
the norm was to take effect was regarded as irrelevant for the interpretation, 
a positivist could not even perceive of  social change. Of  course, a positivist 
would not have denied that, because of  social change, a legal norm may 
miss its purpose and produce dysfunctional results. But this was regarded 
as a matter for the law-maker, not for the law-applier. It was this deficit that 
largely contributed to the decline of  positivism after the far-reaching social 
change in the wake of  the Industrial Revolution and World War I.
There is yet another influential theory of  interpretation that claims 
to preclude all subjective influences, namely originalism. Different from 
positivism, originalists believe that only a historical method is the right 
way to ascertain the meaning of  a legal norm. The law-applier must give 
a norm, in particular a constitutional norm, no meaning other than the 
one that the framers had had in mind. Sometimes originalism appears in 
a crude way that excludes the application of  a norm to any phenomenon 
the framers could not have known. If  the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution protects the freedom of  the press, this would not allow 
the law-applicant to extend the protection to radio and TV by way of  
interpretation. Sometimes originalism appears in a more enlightened 
form. The law-applier is then permitted to ask whether the framers clearly 
would have included a new phenomenon had they known it at the time 
the law was enacted. In this case it would be methodologically permissible 
to include radio and TV into the protection of  the First Amendment by 
way of  interpretation. But like a positivist an originalist is not prepared 
to acknowledge that there can be more than one sound interpretation 
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of  a norm and that the interpretation can legitimately change when the 
circumstances change in which it is applied. 
The problem with originalism is first a practical one. In most cases 
it is difficult, even impossible, to discern the original understanding or the 
original intent. It is even more difficult if  many persons are involved in the 
process of  constitution-making, many of  whom may not have expressed 
their understanding or intent. For this reason ascertaining the original 
intent or understanding is often a highly selective process, in which some 
utterances of  actors are singled out and taken for the whole. The second 
problem is the similar to that which positivism encountered. There is 
extremely limited, or even no, room for adapting legal norms to social 
change. If  social change affects the constitution adversely the only remedy 
is to amend the text, which can be extremely complicated in a country like 
the United States. The constitution tends to petrify, in opposition to the 
theory of  a living constitution.
Although one would have difficulties in finding positivists or 
originalists in Germany, these methodologies are by no means of  historical 
interest only. Positivism, or more precisely a crude literal understanding, 
plays a considerable role in a number of  post-communist countries and 
in parts of  Latin America. Originalism has a stronghold in the United 
States in reaction to the activist Warren Court of  the 1950s and 1960s. 
In Germany, the idea that a legal method exists that can exclude any 
subjective element from the interpretation of  legal norms is no longer 
maintained. The same is true for the majority of  American legal scholars. 
But the consequences drawn from this premise differ considerably in 
the two countries. A very powerful school in the United States, Critical 
Legal Studies, is of  the opinion that not only law-making is a political 
operation, but also is the interpretation and application of  law, with the 
only difference being that the legislature operates in a political setting 
while judges operate in a judicial setting. As a further consequence, the 
focus of  academic interest in the law differs. The question many American 
jurists tend to ask is: how will the courts decide? The dominant question 
in Germany would be: what is the correct decision? 
In the last resort a different attitude toward the autonomy of  
the law appears behind the two concepts. While adherence to Critical 
Legal Studies does not leave much room for scholars to recognize the 
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autonomy of  the legal system, in Germany at least a relative autonomy 
of  the law is widely accepted. This concept acknowledges on the one 
hand that law is a political product. It emerges from the legislative process, 
where political arguments dominate. On the other hand, once enacted 
the law is disconnected from politics. It is up to the legislature to decide 
whether a legal norm remains in force or not. But as long as it is in force 
its application does not follow political criteria. It is not only a difference 
in the institutional setting of  political and judicial decisions. There is also 
a specific rationality of  the legal system, which differs from the rationality 
of  the political system. 
This difference is not without impact on the recruitment and 
the behaviour of  judges. If  interpretation and application of  the law is 
regarded as a political operation, the political preferences and affiliations 
of  the judges are important, whereas they do not matter as much when 
the neutralizing effect of  legal rationality is recognized. The degree of  
politicization of  the judiciary is linked to this. It explains at the same time 
the constant concern of  the American constitutionalists as well as the 
American public with the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty or the 
undemocratic character of  judicial review, which is more or less absent in 
Germany and other countries where the establishment of  judicial review 
was a reaction to the experience with non-democratic regimes. 
An inside perspective of  a constitutional court can confirm the 
extent to which doctrine and methodology are able to bridge ideological 
differences. During my term on the bench I could observe that decisions 
were not necessarily result-driven. Legal arguments mattered and it 
happened quite often that members of  the court changed their mind 
because of  the arguments exchanged in the deliberation. Of  course, this 
observation in one court cannot be generalized. But it certainly shows the 
importance of  requiring judges to give reasons for a decision. It is true 
that there may be good reasons for different results, but it is also true that 
not every result can be supported by legal reasons.
Which method guides the German Constitutional Court when it 
decides constitutional conflicts? Authentic descriptions by the Court itself  
are rare, and where they appear in an opinion they do not come in form of  a 
systematic and coherent explanation. Courts hardly discuss methodological 
questions, let alone describe in their opinions which method they followed. 
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The method is practised, not theoretically developed. This means that 
it must be inferred from the way a court usually reaches its solutions. 
Easier than a positive statement on which method the Court adopts is 
the negative statement on what it avoids: there are neither positivists nor 
originalists on the bench in Germany, which means neither that the text 
of  the constitution is neglected nor that historical arguments are absent. 
In general terms, the prevailing method can be described as purposive 
or functional. Constitutional norms are regarded as expressions of  values 
or principles that society wanted to establish on the highest legal level. 
These values, in turn, inform the concretization of  those constitutional 
provisions that apply to a concrete case. The goal of  interpretation is to 
give utmost effect to these values or principles behind the text. Whenever 
the meaning of  a constitutional provision vis-à-vis a concrete issue is to be 
determined, the Court asks for the objective that a constitutional provision 
pursues or for the function that it is to fulfil in society. Why shall the media 
be free? Why does the family enjoy the special protection of  the state? 
Why is parliament limited in delegating legislative power to the executive? 
Why are political parties obliged to organize themselves democratically 
and to lay open their finances? 
The result of  value inquiries matters. It makes a difference whether 
the idea behind freedom of  the media is to give owners and journalists 
the possibility to disseminate their individual opinions to a larger public 
or whether it aims to allow owners to make as much profit as possible, 
or whether it is meant to enable the individual recipient to form his or 
her opinion and to guarantee that society gets the information it needs 
in the interest of  self-government. In the two first cases media regulation 
would present a constitutional problem, in the third case it may be a 
constitutional obligation. If  a conflict between constitutionally protected 
values arises the Court does not establish a hierarchy among them but tries 
to harmonize them in a way that both retain as much as possible of  their 
content. Thus balancing becomes an important tool for the Court when it 
adjudicates fundamental rights issues. 
The methodological maxim, according to which the purpose of  the 
constitutional provision at stake shall be given the utmost effect, has a 
further consequence that characterizes the methodological attitude of  the 
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German Court: what the utmost effect is cannot be ascertained without 
knowledge about the segment of  social reality in which the constitutional 
provision is to take effect. Legal norms are formulated in the context of  
a certain state of  social reality. Next to text and purpose this context is 
constitutive for the meaning of  the legal norm. But different from the 
text and the purpose, which are determined by the legislature and remain 
the same as long as the norm is in force, the context is subject to social 
change. As a consequence, an interpretation that served the purpose best 
under certain conditions may cease to do so under changed conditions. 
If  this is so, sticking to the original interpretation can lead to 
suboptimal results. It can even miss the function of  the norm completely and 
produce dysfunctional results. The Court’s jurisprudence takes social reality 
into account in order to ensure that the law keeps up with new challenges 
and retains its normative force vis-à-vis new problems. The Court even 
goes one step further and asks for the probable consequences of  alternative 
interpretations in the real world and then chooses the interpretation whose 
consequences are closer to the normative purpose. In this way, it reacts in 
particular to new threats to constitutionally protected liberties that arise 
from scientific and technological developments and their commercial use 
and thus broadens the protective scope of  fundamental rights. 
In sum, this method endows the constitution with high practical 
relevance. A number of  important doctrinal innovations owe their existence 
to this approach, such as the principle of  proportionality, the horizontal 
effect of  human rights, and the constitutional obligation of  the legislature 
to protect fundamental rights against menaces from private actors or 
societal forces. They have since been adopted in many new constitutions 
or in the jurisprudence of  many constitutional courts. Yet, it is just this 
dynamic interpretation of  the Court that returns us to the question of  
the law-politics divide. At what point does a new interpretation amount 
to an amendment of  the constitution? Of  course, in a formal sense an 
amendment requires a textual change of  the constitution. This cannot 
be done by a court. In a more substantive sense, however, changes in the 
meaning of  given text may have a bigger impact than textual changes. 
In sixty years, the Basic Law has been formally amended 52 times. 
Yet, the changes by way of  interpretation, particularly in the field of  
fundamental rights, are certainly of  a similar if  not greater impact. Is there 
 R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 3, t. 1, p. 55-71, set.-dez., 2019 70 
T
O
M
O
 1
a borderline behind which interpretation turns from a legal into a political 
operation? The answer cannot be different from the one given earlier. As 
long as the interpretation is derived from the text in a legally acceptable 
way, it remains within the realm of  the law. The political consequences 
may nevertheless be severe. Every new content that a court derives 
from constitutional norms changes the balance between the political 
branches of  government and the judiciary, mostly in of  favour of  the 
latter. Sometimes this is called judicial imperialism. But it is necessary to 
distinguish between intent and effect. The intent of  courts usually is to 
give effect to constitutional requirements. The effect often is a gain of  
power that corresponds with a loss of  power on the side of  the legislature. 
Still it seems very difficult to convince courts not to enforce what for them 
follows from the constitution.
In this situation many authors resort to judicial self-restraint as a 
remedy. But self-restraint, as commendable as it might be, is but an appeal 
to professional ethics, not a legal rule. Descriptively, one can distinguish 
between active and deferential courts. Prescriptively, no operational criteria 
are visible. Too many factors are at stake, and often closer analysis shows 
that an interpretation which looks extremely bold is well-founded under 
the circumstances in which it was taken. In addition, it is by no means clear 
that there is a connection between judicial self-restraint and the degree of  
politicization of  courts. The German Constitutional Court, for example, 
is more active than the U.S. Supreme Court but it is less politicized.
A more promising tool to limit the expansion of  judicial power is the 
amending power. Courts are bound by the text of  law. Changing the text 
belongs to the political power. The political powers can re-programme the 
judiciary when they disapprove of  their jurisprudence. There is, however, 
one important difference between ordinary courts and constitutional 
courts. If  the legislature is of  the opinion that the interpretation of  a law 
runs against their legislative intention it can change the law with a simple 
majority. Constitutional courts apply the constitution whose amendment 
is usually more difficult and for good reasons. Yet, only by amending 
the constitution can the political branches of  government correct or re-
programme constitutional courts. Therefore, amendments should not be 
made too difficult. When they are very difficult, as in the United States, the 
burden of  adapting the constitution to new challenges lies on the judges’ 
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shoulders and makes them more political. If  the judges shy away from 
carrying this burden, say for methodological reasons like originalism, and 
the amendment procedure is extremely difficult, it is to the detriment of  
the normative force of  the constitution. 
Amendments are an external corrective to the power of  courts. But 
there is also an internal corrective: even if  it is true that, what is legally 
acceptable and what is not can only be defined in the legal system, it is 
never defined once and for all and judges are not the only actors to take 
part in the ongoing discussion. It is therefore extremely important that 
constitutional courts are embedded in a lively discourse in which the 
division of  functions between the political and the juridical branches 
of  government, the acceptability of  legal methods, and the soundness 
of  interpretations are constantly evaluated and readjusted. Judicial 
independence is not in danger when judges pay attention to the reaction 
their decisions elicit in society.
